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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DAVID K. PETIT,

: Case No. 960032-CA
Priority No. 2
:

Defendant/Appellant.

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following are set forth in full in Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend. IV
Utah Const, art. I, § 14
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-502 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(2)
1995)

(1995)

(repealed effective May 1,

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
(Responding to State's brief at p.2)
The State misquotes State v. Anderson, 910 P. 2d 1229
(Utah 1996) for an improper standard of review.

1234, Anderson cites
600 P.2d
Eastmond,
clearly

543, 545

for

a different

proposition

At 910 P. 2d at

State v. Rocha,

(Utah 1979), which in turn quotes State v.

499 P.2d

276, 278

(Utah 1972),

for a now

erroneous

standard

of

for

determinations.

review

incorrect

probable

cause

The language the State attributes to Anderson

arises from Eastmond, is quoted in Rocha, but appears nowhere in
Anderson.

Anderson itself states the standard of review as follows:
We review the factual findings underlying the
trial court's decision under the clearly erroneous
standard. State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992) .
This court will find that clear error exists only if the
factual findings made by the trial court are not
adequately supported by the record. State v. Pena. 869
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
However, this court
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on
such facts under a correctness standard, according no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Pena,
869 P.2d at 936; accord State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433
(Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah
1991) .
Anderson, 910 P. 2d at 1232.

Contrary to the State's incorrect

assertion, the issue in this appeal is not subject to a clearly
erroneous standard of review.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. A PROTECTIVE SEIZURE IS DISTINGUISHABLE
FROM AN INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION.
(Responding to State's brief at Point I, pp. 8-19)
The State presents its argument as though the police were
engaged in a valid Terry stop prior to the sudden movement that
gave rise to Officer Tuttle's safety concern.

This is not so;

prior to the sudden movement, police had no reason to suspect Mr.
Petit of any crime.

R. 33, 35, 36, 47, 48-9.

Unlike the typical

protective seizure case, where a valid Terry stop or other police
action

is already under way, this case began as a protective

seizure.
This case likewise must be distinguished from routine
traffic stops. Here, Mr. Petit was not stopped by the police prior
to them drawing their weapons upon him.
2

The State cites Michigan

v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048 n.13, 103 S.Ct 3469, 3480 n.13, 77
L.Ed.2d 1201, 1219 n.13

(1983), for statistics concerning police

shootings when an officer approaches a stopped vehicle, State's
brief at 12, but those situations generally arise during traffic
stops.

Here, Mr. Petit had not been stopped, and no encounter with

the police had been initiated.

The police had less to fear than in

a traffic stop, where the encounter has already been initiated and
the suspect is cognizant of an imminent request for identification
and a warrants check.

Simply stated, citizens do not on a regular

basis go "hunting" for police officers to assault or kill, and
certainly not officers in groups of three.

POINT

II.
THE STATE'S
FACILE ATTEMPT
TO
DISTINGUISH CASES RELIED UPON BY MR. PETIT IS
NOT WELL TAKEN.

(Responding to State's brief at p. 14)
The State attempts to distinguish all of the authority
relied on by appellant "since none of the suspects involved made a
sudden

movement

officers."
without

posing

an

immediate

State's brief at 14.

merit.

The

State

fails

potential

threat

This distinction
to

cite

any

case

to

the

is wholly
for

the

proposition that, under the fourth amendment, a sudden movement
justifies any response regardless of the force involved.

Appellant

is aware of none.
Fourth

amendment

issues

are

fact

intensive,

and

reasonableness is reviewed under the totality of the circumstances.
E.g. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1202 (Utah 1995).
3

The State

recognizes this proposition in its brief.

State's Br. at 6 ("Under

the totality of the circumstances . . . " ) ;

12 ("In reviewing the

totality of facts and circumstances here . . . " ) ;
totality of circumstances . . . " ) ;
determination

after

14 ("Under the

and 15 ("And it must make the

evaluating

[t]he

'totality

of

the

circumstances.' United States v. Fernandez. 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th
Cir. 1994) . ") .
The sudden movement at issue here must be considered
under the totality of the circumstances, and does not distinguish
case law cited by Mr. Petit.

Here, the sudden movement gave rise

to Officer Tuttle's safety concern.

In United States v. King, 990

F.2d 1552 (10th Cir. 1993), it was the officer's observation of a
loaded handgun on the front seat of the vehicle that gave rise to
safety concerns.

If anything, the safety concern in King was more

palpable than that here.

Mr. Petit's sudden movement was equally

consistent with spilling a cup of coffee.

The loaded handgun in

King was not as potentially innocuous as a spilled cup of coffee.
A loaded handgun is always dangerous.

Here, in fact, there was no

weapon at all.

POINT III. THE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED THE
ENCOUNTER ONCE MR. PETIT'S HANDS WERE IN VIEW
AND HE NO LONGER POSED ANY SAFETY HAZARD.
(Responding to State's brief at p. 19.)
The State asserts that holding Mr. Petit at gunpoint,
approaching

his vehicle, and looking

to see what he may have

spilled or been reaching for, was reasonable, necessary, and "the
4

least intrusive means available to see what defendant was reaching
for."

State's brief at 19.

The State seems to be suggesting that

the officers had a sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion of
contraband to permit them to search Mr. Petit1s vehicle.

This is

not so.
This encounter was initiated as a result of Mr. Petit 's
sudden movement.

Officer Tuttle had no idea what Mr. Petit may

have been reaching for, may have spilled, or any other reason why
the sudden movement was made.

The movement, coupled with the

officers's experience and the location in the high crime area
around Pioneer Park, led to a reasonable concern that Mr. Petit may
have been about to assault the officers. Under Terry, the scope of
the encounter must be

Ml

strictly tied to and justified by' the

circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
(quoting Warden v. Havden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1652,
18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
Officer Tuttle was investigating a possible assault upon
himself.

Once he unholstered his weapon and drew down on Mr.

Petit, and Mr. Petit complied with orders to freeze and place his
hands in plain view, Officer Tuttle's reasonable suspicions should
have

been

dispelled.

At

that

point

in

time

Mr.

Petit

was

compliant, and Office Tuttle was not being assaulted with a weapon
or in any fashion.

There was no longer any need for Office Tuttle

to have his sidearm aimed at Mr. Petit's head.

5

Significantly, as in King, it was not illegal to carry a
handgun in a vehicle on October 13, 1994, the date of this offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(2)

(1995)

(repealed effective May 1,

1995) . All that was required is that the weapon not be "loaded,"
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-502 (1995), meaning that no round can be in
the

firing position and no round

mechanical operation.
n.10 (Utah 1996).

can be

fired with a

single

State v. Chapman, 295 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 23

Utah also issues concealed weapon permits, Utah

Code Ann. §53-5-704 (Supp. 1996), allowing holders to carry loaded
weapons in vehicles.

Whether Mr. Petit had a firearm is thus

irrelevant, as it was legal to carry a firearm in a vehicle.
Despite the complete lack of any present danger to the
officers, Officer Tuttle continued to hold Mr. Petit at gunpoint.
Under the fourth amendment, he was arrested as of that moment.

The

police had no reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime had
been committed,

or that one would be committed.

Despite

his

curiosity as to what Mr. Petit may have been reaching for, Officer
Tuttle should have holstered his weapon and proceeded on his way.
Absent an articulable suspicion, the fourth amendment does not
allow the police to hold citizens at gunpoint for the sole purpose
of allowing the police to satisfy their curiosity.

Once Mr. Petit

was compliant, and the perceived danger had thus vanished, it was
incumbent on Officer Tuttle to holster his weapon and allow Mr.
Petit to go about his business.
"The

narrow

intrusions

involved

in

[Terry

and

its

progeny] were judged by a balancing test rather than by the general
6

principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported by the
'long-prevailing standards' of probable cause, Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. [160,] 176, 69 S.Ct. [1302,] 1311, [93 L.Ed. 1879
(1949)], only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind
of intrusion associated with an arrest."

Dunawav v. New York, 442

U.S. 200, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2256, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).

In no

sense can the intrusion here be characterized as falling "far short
of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest." Mr. Petit was
arrested,

prior

paraphernalia.

to

police

discovery

of

any

plain

view

drug

The evidence should have been suppressed.

Mr. Petit relies on his opening brief in response to
those portions of the State's brief not specifically addressed
here.

CONCLUSION
The officers' actions here are indistinguishable from an
arrest.

Because the officers' conduct was unreasonably forceful

and less intrusive actions would have been adequate to protect
their safety, their actions constitute an arrest without probable
cause.

Mr. Petit's motion to suppress should have been granted.

This Court should reverse and remand with directions that the
motion to suppress be granted and Mr. Petit be allowed to withdraw
his conditional plea.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Al-tiL day of September, 1996.

ROBERT K. &EINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

MARK R. MOFFAT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and four copies to BARNARD N. MADSEN, the Attorney
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this
<£7-fc)L

day of September, 1996.

dud—
/

DELIVERED/MAILED this

RobertK.Heineman

day of September, 1996.
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(2) (1995) (repealed effective
May 1, 1995) provided:
Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any
person, except persons described in Section 76-10-503,
from keeping within his place of residence, place of
business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm,
except that it shall be a class B misdemeanor to carry a
loaded firearm in a vehicle.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) provides:
77-7-15.
Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect -- Grounds.
A peace office may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he
has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.

The

fourth

amendment

to

the

federal

constitution

provides:
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 14.
[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance
of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-502 (1995) provides:
76-10-502.

When weapon deemed loaded.

(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any
pistol,
revolver, shotgun, rifle, or other
weapon
described in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when
there is an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in
the firing position.
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed
to be loaded when an unexpended cartridge, shell, or
projectile is in a position whereby the manual operation
of any mechanism once would cause the
unexpended
cartridge, shell, or projectile to be fired.
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to
be loaded when it is capped or primed and has a powder
charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders.

